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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
OWNERSHIP OF STREETS AND RIGHTS OF
ABUTTING LANDOWNERS IN COLORADO
By MARSHALL DEE BIESTERFELD*
Streets, highways and roads are designed to allow free, con-
tinuous, convenient passage across the land of others. The passage
is a necessity. Strips of land are placed under control and supervi-
sion of public authorities who are given the duty of keeping the
roadways unobstructed for the good of the public.
The abutting landowner is peculiarly situated in that he not
only uses the streets in common with the general public but also
uses the specific portion of the street abutting his land as an ease-
ment of access. A natural place to lodge limited control over the
actions of the public authorities is in the abutting landowner the
courts have done just this. They have given the abutting landowner
special rights.
Fine distinctions have been pronounced as to the nature of the
title in the public and in the abutting landowner. Elimination of
these has been suggested,' but a definite tendency of the court has
been to uphold the importance of the distinctions. Colorado has,
upon occasion, been unique in its decisions, and for this reason alone
the subject is worthy of inspection.
2
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF STREETS
Public streets can come into existence in several ways. The
object is to place land in the possession and control of public au-
thorities so that it can be maintained and kept free from obstruc-
tion. The two most common methods3 by which streets come into
the hands of the authorities are statutory dedications and common
law dedications. Other methods are prescription, condemnation or




Early Colorado statutes required for a successful statutory de-
dication, an accurate plat signed, acknowledged and filed with the
county clerk and city clerk. That plat had to be recorded by the
county clerk with his certificate. Fulfilling these requirements
would vest the streets in the city, in trust for public uses.3
Those have been repealed and stree's become vested in the city
through the procedures for incorporation which include presenting
a petition with an accurate plat, holding an election, making return
of election to the court and electing officersY
* Senior student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 30.37 (3d ed. 1950) quoting from Lewis, Eminent
Domain.
2 All cases were read and are noted in text or footnotes that are digested in West's Colorado
Digest under Municipal Corporations, Key Numbers 646 through 698. Certain other cases pertirent
to this paper may be found under the topics Dedication and Highways.
3 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.01 (3d ed. 1950).
4 An act of Congress is also a method of creating a public highway: "The right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."
Rev. Stat. § 2477 (1875), 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1958).
5 These statutes can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 163, §§ 152 to 159 (1935).
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-1-1 to 139-1-9 (1953), as amended, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-1.3,5 (Supp.
1960). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1 (1953) for dedications as county highways.
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The Colorado Supreme Court has often said that a statutory
dedication will be successful only if in strict compliance with the
statutes. 7 A statutory dedication will fail, at least against a pur-
chaser of the land without notice, where the plat and notes do not
describe the road as running through the land purchased.8 A dedica-
tion has failed because the acceptance did not get the required
number of votes in the city council. 9 Lack of acknowledgment of
the plat can invalidate the statutory dedication.' 0 As will be dis-
cussed infra, the ownership of the street is altered by these failures.
A statutory dedication operates by way of grant. A common law
dedication operates by way of estoppel in pais.1" The dedication
must be express when statutory and can be either express or im-
plied when at common law. The statutory dedication will usually
vest an estate in some type of fee simple,' 2 whereas the common
law dedication gives the public an easement.
Often the failure of a statutory dedication will result in a valid
common law dedication because of the relative simplicity of the
latter.13 However, neither may result. An individual prevailed when
he purchased without notice of the existence of a road because re-
cording mistakes made the statutory dedication invalid. The evid-
ence did not show any public travel along the line of the road, and
the purchaser had done nothing from which to imply an intent to
dedicate.1
4
B. Common Law Dedication
A frequent act that results in a common law dedication is sell-
ing lots with reference to a plat. The Colorado Supreme Court has
several times'; recognized the rule as stated in Angell on Highways:
In this country there is quite a large class of cases in
which dedication has been inferred from the sale of land,
described by reference to a map or plat, in which the same
is designated as laid off into lots, intersected by streets and
alleys. It may be stated as a general rule, that where the
owner of urban property, who has laid it off into lots, with
streets, avenues and alleys intersecting the same, sells his
lots with reference to a plat, in which the same is so laid
off, he adopts such map by sales with reference thereto, his
acts will amount to a dedication of the designated streets,
avenues and alleys to the public.'
Correctly speaking, however, Colorado follows the general rule
that the sale of lots with reference to a plat is only an offer to de-
dicate; the acceptance by the city is necessary to complete the de-
dication, and the grantee of the lots has no right against the city
7 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); John Mouat
Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac, 237 (1895); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo.
472 (1877).
S Lieber v. People, 33 Colo. 493, 81 Poc. 270 (1905).
9 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906).
10 Town of Center v. Collier, 26 Colo. App. 354, 144 Poc. 1123 (1914).
11 City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); City of Denver
v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
12 Brell v. Town of Ovid, 88 Colo. 198, 293 Pac. 961 (1930) concerns a dedication under present
statutes.
13 See note 7 supra.
14 See note 8 supro.
15 John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); Ward v. Farwell,
6 Colo. 66 (1881); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
16 Angell, Highways § 149 (3d ed. 1886).
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until that acceptance.' 7 This is not a universal rule. Some jurisdic-
tions hold that the grantee has rights against the city in that this
method of dedication is completed with the sale. The rule's justi-
fication rests in the reliance of the grantee upon the representation
that streets are present.'" In every case the grantee has a private
easement he can enforce against the grantor."t
A common law dedication can arise by offering either expressly
or impliedly to dedicate certain land to the public for street pur-
poses. More controversy naturally arises over the issue of implied
dedication. In Starr v. People,20 the court set down rules to govern
the finding of an implied dedication:
In an action of this kind a dedication may be implied:
1. When it is satisfactorily proved that it was the
owner's intention to set apart the land occupied as a road,
to the use of the public as a highway, and that there has
been an acceptance by the public of the land for such use;
2. The evidence of intent must consist of such acts or
declarations by the owner as clearly and unequivocally in-
dicate his purpose to make the dedication, or such conduct
on his part as equitably estops him from denying such in-
tention;
3. The acts and declarations of the owner connected
with the matter of the alleged dedication may be given in
evidence in his favor;
4. The line of the road must be certain and definite; a
general privilege or license by the owner to cross his lands,
without reference to any special route, will not suffice;
5. User of the road by the public for a considerable
length of time without objection by the owner of the land
may increase the weight of the evidence, if any there be,
arising from acts or declarations of the owner indicating his
intent to dedicate. But mere user, without such acts or de-
clarations, unless for a period of time corresponding to the
statutory limitation of real actions, cannot be held suffici-
ent to vest the easement in the public, as by prescription.
2'
In Mitchell v. City of Denver,'2 2 even though the city, six or
seven years before the trial, had graded the street and put up sign
posts and street names, there was no implied dedication because of
lack of evidence of intent where the owner had platted the area
but had reserved the strip in question for private use for itself, its
successors and assigns.
The Colorado court, in the Starr case ,23 refused to find an im-
plied dedication where the road passing through the placer mining
claim was used by the public. The line of the road was moved sev-
eral times as the owner "washed" the gravel for mineral, and the
public authorities made some repairs but without being so induced
by the owner, and the owner had refused to allow any road to be
used except as might be convenient to him at the time.
17 John Movat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); City of Denver v.
Clements, 3 Colo. 472 (1877).
1 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 33.45 (3d ed. 1950).
19 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.24 ,3d ed. 1950); Note, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 88 (1960).
20 17 Colo. 458, 30 Pac. 64 (1892).
21 Id. at 460, 30 Pac. at 65.
22 33 Colo. 37, 78 Pac. 686 (1904).
23 Starr v. People, supra note 20.
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In Christianson v. Cecil,2 4 the court found an implied dedica-
tion where the original owner made statements that he intended it
to be a public alley. The city cut the curb, cleaned the alley and
ribbed the sidewalk crossing, and the line of the alley was definite
and had been used for more than twenty years.
To prevent the municipality from being burdened indiscrimin-
ately with the preservation of streets whenever an individual should
see fit to dedicate a portion of his land for use as streets, the courts
require that the offer must have been accepted by the city before
the dedication is complete.2 5 This acceptance theoretically takes
place when it is in the public interest to possess and control the
street. During the time after the offer and prior to acceptance, the
city is not bound to any duties in connection with the land and ac-
quires no rights or interest therein. -6 The landowner is free to with-
draw his offer of dedication unless some public or private rights
have intervened.27 The owner can revoke the offer merely by con-
veying the same land to another.2 8 Conversely the city may lose its
right to accept by the doctrine of estoppel in pais.'t In John Mouat
Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 10 the case was remanded on the ques-
tion of the city having been estopped where it appeared the city
had never, in the twenty years since the offer of dedication, ac-
cepted, repaired or improved the streets dedicated, and at the same
time the area had been fenced and a house built.
Whenever a street or highway is abandoned or vacated it is no
longer public property. The public officials are not responsible for
its repair, and being private property, it must be rededicated ac-
cording to all the rules applying to dedications before it will again
become a street.-
C. Prescription
Another method that has arisen in Colorado cases by which
land becomes a public street is prescription or adverse user.32 Tradi-
tional elements are needed to establish prescription. In addition,
Colorado has a statute allowing a road to become a public highway
if used adversely for twenty years." Under this statute the elements
necessary are that the user "must have been adverse, that is, under
claim of right; the line of road must have been reasonably definite
and certain; there must have been an unqualified intention to set
apart a line for the road, and the use must have been more than
mere permissive use.1'3 4 Prescription cannot be established by an
"indefinite and indiscriminate use of a wide extent of country at
the whim or caprice of the traveler.""--, Continuous public use for
24 109 Colo. 510, 127 P.2d 325 (1942).
25 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952); Trine v. City of Pueblo, 21 Colo. 102,
39 Pac. 330 (1895); John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895); City
of Denver v. Denver & S.F.Ry., 17 Colo. 583, 31 Pac. 338 (1892). If the city accepts, the acceptance
must be subject to any pre-existing rights of way. City of Denver v. Denver & S.F.Ry., 17 Colo.
583, 31 Pac. 338 (1892); City of Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo. 345, 3 Pac. 693 (1884).
26 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952); Board of County Comm'rs v. Warneke, 85
Colo. 388, 276 Pac. 671 (1929).
27 11 McQuilfin, Municipal Corporations § 33.60 (3d ed. 1950).
"S Trine v. City of Pueblo, 21 Colo. 102, 39 Pac. 330 (1895).
29 John Mouat Lumber Co. v. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 1, 40 Pac. 237 (1895).
3 ) Ibid.
'41 Hand v. Rhodes, 125 Colo. 508, 245 P.2d 292 (1952).
32 Hecker v. City & County of Denver, 80 Colo. 390, 252 Pac. 808 (1927); Mitchell v. City of
Denver, 33 Colo. 37, 78 Pac. 686 (1904).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1(3) (1953).
34 Lieber a. People, 33 Colo. 493, 499, 81 Pac. 270, 271 (1905). Accord, Olson v. People, 56
Colo. 199, 138 Pac. 21 (1914); Starr v. People, 17 Colo. 458, 30 Pac. 64 (1892).
35 Friel v. People, 4 Colo. App. 259, 260, 35 Pac. 676, 677 (1894).
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the full length of time must be present.' 6 Wire gates across a private
road so that travelers must open and close them will prevent that
road from becoming a public highway under this statute.3 7
Recently the court quoted this statute in justification of a deci-
sion s.3 8 The statute seems to add little to the case; the requirements
of the statute are the same as at common law.
Some land was levied upon for taxes and the county became
the tax sale certificate holder. With the county's permission, the
road in question was then constructed across a portion of this land
and was continuously used by the public from 1938 to 1960. In 1945
a treasurer's deed to some of the land was issued to some of the
plaintiffs and in 1956 one was issued to the remaining plaintiffs.
These plaintiffs, in 1960, claimed ownership of the street area and
the right to hold it free from the easement.
The court held: (1) the county's tax sale certificate was only
a lien and the county was thus not the true owner from which per-
mission could be obtained to negative the adverse nature of the use;
(2) the treasurer's deeds of 1945 and 1956 did not convey a title
free from adverse use; and (3) the use fulfilled the requirements
to establish a public highway under the statute.
The true owner had, in effect, lost his land and would lose noth-
ing more from adverse use across it. Even though the original
owner retained record title, the county was the party most inter-
ested in preserving the parcel of ground in order to realize payment
for delinquent taxes. Prescription will not ripen against the govern-
36 Goerke v. Town of Manitou, 25 Colo. App. 482, 139 Poc. 1049 (1914).
37 Martino v. Fleenor, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1961).
38 Town of Silver Plume v. Hudson, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1963).
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ment;3 9 neither should this adverse use operate toward a ripenec
easement where the county was the preserving party for at leas'
seven years.
Furthermore, Colorado has said that adverse possession will b(
interrupted by a treasurer's deed.4 0 The court distinguished thi,
case on the basis that here was an easement established by th(
public. The court did not elaborate. A tax deed traditionally passe,
title free from all other interests. Although a majority hold that ar
easement is not extinguished, other cases have held that easement,
established after the land is assessed are extinguished by the tal
deed because the government is entitled to drive proceeds on th(
land as it was assessed and not on land as it is later burdened witl
an easement.4 Here the land as levied upon was free from easemeni
or adverse use.
The fact that the street was constructed and plainly used sc
that any grantee in 1945 or 1956 should have had sufficient notice
of the easement, lends some support to the court, but it announced
no helpful principle of decision. The outcome is that the bare fac
situation of adverse use as a road by the public prior to issuance ol
a treasurer's deed will result in a decision favorable to the advers-
ing public.
The result cannot be criticized. The court refused to allow pri-
vate individuals, who could have known of the road, to take the
only main access from the east into the mountain town of Silver
Plume.
II. TITLE
A. Common Law Easement
At common law a presumption exists that only an easement is
created when a street is dedicated to the public unless there is some
statement to the contrary. The reasoning is that an easement is the
greatest privilege needed by the public to be able to pass freely over
the street. Colorado is in line with this common law rule when the
dedication is by common law rather than by statutory proceedings.
4 2
The 1906 case of City of Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co.43
was disposed of in a manner consistent with the rule of the creation
of an easement. A statutory dedication had failed but a common
law dedication resulted from the failure. This type of resulting com-
mon law dedication was not differently treated from any intended
common law dedication; that is, it resulted in conveying an ease-
ment only. A published opinion in 1901 upon the same Coronado
Mining case on an earlier appeal14 had included much dicta that the
fee passed. The reasoning in that case was that by the attempted
statutory dedication the dedicator must of necessity have intended a
fee to pass, therefore his intention would govern in the resulting
3., 17A Am. Jur. Easements §68 (1957)
441 Jocobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008 (1957); Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55, 308
P.2d 216 (1957).
41 See 17A Am. Jur. Easements § 169 (1957).
42 Hecker v. City & County of Denver, 80 Colo. 390, 252 Poc. 808 (1927); City of Leadville v.
Coronodo Mining Co., 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472(1877>.
43 37 Colo. 234, 86 Pac. 1034 (1906).
44 29 Colo. 17, 67 Pac. 289 (1901).
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common law dedication. Upon the later appeal the court stated that
the dicta was pot controlling.
B. Statutory Fee
When statutory proceedings are proper, a "fee" vests in the city
by virtue of statute. An early statute provided:
Upon the filing of any such map or plat, the fee of all
streets, alleys, avenues, highways, parks, and other parcels
of ground reserved therein to the use of the public, shall
vest in such city or town, if incorporated, in trust, for the
uses therein named and expressed; or if such town be not
incorporated, then in the county, until such town shall be-
come incorporated, for the like uses.
45
1. Qualified Fee-In Trust. In Olin v. Denver & R. G. R. R.,4 6
the court declared that the city held title to the street solely for
street purposes and that the nature of the title was a qualified fee.
The fee would terminate when the land was no longer used for
street purposes.
The statute that now vests the fee in the city, found in the
article providing for incorporation, reads:
All avenues, streets, alleys, parks, and other places de-
signated or described as for public use on the map or plat
of any city or town, or of any addition made to such city
or town, shall be deemed to be public property, and the fee
thereof be vested in such city or town.
4
7
The first opinion in the same Coronado Mining case as dis-
cussed above made much of the absence of the words "in trust" in
the later statute quoted here. The writer of the opinion thought that
a successful statutory dedication passed a fee simple absolute to the
city unburdened by the trust. The thought was that under the new
statute the streets would no longer be held as a qualified fee, as a
fee simple on special limitation. With that interpretation, it was
easy to conclude that the mining under the street could be legal
only with permission from the city.
As mentioned earlier, that opinion lost most of its vitality when
the second appeal decision was announced and the court refused to
follow the opinion of the first appeal. Some credit must be given
for the realization of the impact in the changed wording, but as late
as 1942 the court had reiterated the presence of a trust for the peo-
ple.
48
2. Absolute Fee in Surface. The remarks as to the words "in
trust" undoubtedly had some influence upon City of Leadville v.
Bohn Mining Co.,49 another case decided in 1906. This case deserves
special discussion. It should be borne in mind that because of the
change in the statute that had been noticed, the contention was
strong that the vested fee must be a fee simple absolute.
The mining company was extracting minerals from under an
area of the city. The mining was at a depth of four hundred or five
45 This can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 163, § 156 (1935).
4625 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454 (1898). Further effect upon the title at time of vacation -ill be
considered intro.
47 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-1-7 (1953).
48 City of Colorado Springs v. Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P.2d 988 (1942).
49 37 Colo. 248, 86 Pac. 1038 (1906). The New Mexico Supreme Court has said that its identical
statute would have to be interpreted as in this Colorado case. Phillips Mercantile Co. v. City of
Albuquerque, 60 N.M. 1, 287 P.2d 77 (1955).
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hundred feet and would in no way interefere with the ordinary uses
of the city streets. The city, however, claiming it owned a fee simple
absolute in the streets, brought suit to restrain further mining and
recover damages for the ores already taken. The city had acquired
its rights from a good statutory dedication. Clearly the mining com-
pany could not be allowed to keep the minerals under the theory
that there had been merely a common law dedication which passes
only an easement. Here some sort of fee was definitely in the city
by virtue of the statute: "All avenues, streets . . .described as for
public use on the map or plat of any city or town .. . , shall be
deemed to be public property and the fee thereof be vested in such
city or town. ' ' 5t The court felt the question presented was: What
constitutes a street as contemplated in the statute?
The court used as it basis the traditional definition that the
street included the surface and so much land below the surface as
was necessary for ordinary municipal uses such as storm drains,
sewers, or gas pipes. It was this area and this area only the fee of
which was vested in the city. The city, therefore, could never re-
strain the use of the subsoil so long as it did not interfere with the
ordinary uses of the street. Either by common law easement or by
statutory fee the city is allowed to exercise dominion over the sur-
face and some fifteen feet below the surface.
In review, the city has an easement from a common law dedica-
tion. It has a fee from a statutory dedication. That fee is in so much
of the surface and ground as can legitimately be used for street
purposes. Some doubt exists whether the fee is a fee simple ab-
solute or whether it is a fee simple on a special limitation because it
is held in trust for street purposes and will terminate and revert to
the abutting owners if it should ever cease to be used as a street. A
statute governs the vesting when the street ceases to be used as a
street, so that this point of the discussion may be academic.51
III. USE
The public authorities are vested with a street for the sole pur-
pose of providing free, unobstructed, continuous passage over the
land. Incidental uses may be made if in the public interest and for
public purposes. Municipalities, for instance, can use the subsurface
of the street for sewer pipes, gas pipes and water mains because
these are municipal government uses for the general public, and
streets are especially suitable for such installation.
5 2
The authorities can authorize certain types of use of the street;
they can regulate the use and the users.Y- The city can grant the
privilege of special use and demand compensation therefor which
is deemed to be in the nature of rentals.
54
50 See note 47 supra.
- 1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-12 (1953).
.,2 A county highway within city limits retains its character as county highway but is under
supervision and control of the town. Morrison v. Town of Lafayette, 67 Colo. 220, 184 Poc. 301
(1919).
5;x See Russell v. Aragon, 146 Colo. 332, 361 P.2d 346 (1961) (public authority may abate nui-
sance summarily if not capricious, unreasonable or negligent); Heckendorf v. Town of Littleton, 132
Colo. 108, 286 P.2d 615 (1955) (town can regulate curb cuts, but not so as to deny or unduly hamper
ingress, egress); City & County of Denver r. Trailkill, 125 Colo. 488, 244 P.2d 1074 (1952) (city
cannot prohibit reasonable business on streets; can regulate); Staley v. Vaughn, 92 Colo. 6, 17 P.2d
299 (1932) (Denver has power under charter to regulate vehicular traffic); Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo.
320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913) (no power in municipality to require consent of owners in same block
before one can erect a store building); Colorado & S. Ry. v. City of Fort Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121
Pac. 747 :1911) (city can require railway to operate with due care for public travel).
.4 City & County of Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809 (8th Cir. 1924).
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Anyone may use the public streets in conducting his business
so long as it does not tend permanently to obstruct passage. This
right is subject to the power of the people to make restrictions upon
use. Such a restriction is found in a revocable license needed to op-
erate a bus line.55 Any franchise, a privilege not enjoyed by others
in common, and granted in perpetuity, must come from the sover-
eign, the state, or the city acting under a piece of sovereignty dele-
gated to it.
56
The Colorado Supreme Court has spoken of the power of a
municipality and the purpose of streets in these words:
The incorporating act ... created a trust for the holding of
the fee simple title of, and to, all streets and alleys of the
town, which thereby became vested in the town, in these
simple words, "which shall hold the same for the use of the
public." This means, that any attempted regulation of the
use of the streets or sidewalks, by the town or city, must be
for the benefit of the whole public, for travel, the intended
purpose of their dedication as such, and only such struc-
tures should be maintained in the street and sidewalk areas
as are necessary to meet public requirements and use.
Many reasons might be presented why a city might ob-
struct, or even close, a street or sidewalk temporarily in the
interest of public use or welfare, but it can never authorize
a permanent encroachment by private individuals, and the
latter can never successfully set up a claim of right to en-
cumber the public streets or walks. It then follows that the
city cannot grant the exclusive use of the streets or side-
walks, or any part thereof, to private persons for their use
or gain, for such would be in direct violation of its only
right to accept public streets at all.57
The Colorado Constitution provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use, without just compensation. Such com-
pensation shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners.
of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury, when re-
quired by the owner of the property, in such manner as may
be prescribed by law, and until the same shall be paid to
the owner, or into the court for the owner, the property
shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the proprietary rights
of the owner therein divested."
A. Injunction Against Use
Abutting landowners who do not own the fee in the street, as
in the case of many city streets, do not have an interest that entitles
55 See City of Denver v. Girard, 21 Colo. 447, 42 Pac. 662 (1895).
56 People ex rel. Foley v. Stapleton, 98 Colo. 354, 56 P.2d 931 (1936); Denver & Swansea Ry. v.
Denver City Ry., 2 Colo. 673 (1875); Ward v. Colorado E. R.R., 22 Colo. App. 332, 125 Pac. 567
(1912). The Colorado Constitution has a restrictive provision: "No franchise relating to any street,
alley or public place of said city and county shall be granted except upon the vote of qualifying
taxpaying electors." Colo. Const. art. XX, § 4. See McPhee & McGinnity Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 158
Fed. 5 (8th Cir. 1907); Berman v. City & County of Denver, 120 Colo. 218, 209 P.2d 754 1949). A
city which grants a franchise when it has no authority will later be estopped to deny its power
when it has specifically recognized the grant after the power has been delegated to it. City of
Denver v. Mercantile Trust Co., 201 Fed. 790 (8th Cir. 1912).
57 Wood v. People ex rel. Stonebraker, 96 Colo. 431, 433, 43 P.2d 1001, 1002 (1935).
58 Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
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them to successfully enjoin the use or vacation of a street,59 al-
though they may later have an action for recovery of compensation
in the form of damages. Another view noticed in a recent case is
that a court of equity cannot interfere with the vacation of a street
by public officials except for fraud or plain abuse of power.'0
Probably an injunction could not be obtained even where the
abutting owner held the fee because the constitution speaks of be-
ing "needlessly disturbed." The court would probably hesitate to
find needless disturbance in a city council's decision unless a plain
abuse of power appeared. In contrast, where the use of the streets
is under no valid authority, the obstruction or use then constitutes
a public nuisance and can be enjoined by an individual who suffers
special injury from it.
61
The general public seems to be able to bring suit to cause the
removal of any obstruction of the free passage on streets and side-
walks. The citizen and taxpayer can compel the city to observe its
duty to remove them.
6 '
B. Compensation for Damages
1. Rights of Abutting Owner. Without the aid of the constitu-
tion, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Colorado Central R. R. v. Mol-
landin,63 would not allow recovery for injuries to property from the
use of the street because the fee was in the city and the city has
complete control over the use of the street. Mollandin, the plaintiff,
was more successful in the federal court 64 where he urged the state
constitution as a basis of recovery. That court said the Colorado
Central case was not controlling, and that the use of the street was
a right of property in the plaintiff that, if not taken, was definitely
damaged under the provision in the constitution. The same distinc-
tion can be made in later Colorado cases where the constitution was
always used.
The abutting landowner, even when the fee is in the city, is
said to have a peculiar interest in the street. He holds an easement
59 City of Colorado Springs v. Crumb, 364 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1961); Albi Mercantile Co. v. City
& County of Denver, 54 Colo. 474, 131 Poc. 275 (1913); Haskell v. Denver Tramway Co., 23 Colo.
60, 46 Pac. 121 (1896); Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Toohey, 15 Colo. 297, 25 Pac. 166 (1890); Denver,
U. & P. Ry. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290, 25 Pac. 165 (1890); Denver & S. F. Ry. v. Domke, 11 Colo.
247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
60 City of Colorado Springs v. Crumb, 364 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1961).
61 Word v. Colorado E. R.R., 22 Colo. App. 332, 125 Pac. 567 (1912); Denver & Swansea Ry. v.
Denver City Ry., 2 Colo. 673 (1875).
62 People ex rel. Stonebraker v. Wood, 90 Colo. 506, 10 P.2d 331 (1932). Colo. Rev. Stat.
139-76-2 (1953) imposes the duty to keep the streets open and in repair.
63 4 Colo. 154 (1878).
64 Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry., 14 Fed. 394 (C.C.D.Colo. 1882).
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which is an incorporal hereditament and is property. For wrongful
interference with it, the Colorado court allows compensation.6 The
general rule can be stated: Where the adjacent owner is denied free
use of the street for ingress and egress and the value of his premises
is diminished, it is a damage for which there should be compensa-
tion under the constitution.6 6 But it is damum absque injuria where
it is occasioned by a reasonable improvement of the street by proper
authorities for the greater convenience of the public.6 7 Recovery is
denied for these reasonable improvements, these reasonably antici-
pated uses, upon the justification that the adjacent owner contem-
plated, at the time he dedicated or at the time he purchased, that
the city would alter the use.
2. Uses-Anticipated-Unanticipated. It now becomes impor-
tant to determine what are "anticipated uses" and what are "unan-
ticipated uses." In dictum in two early Colorado cases6 s the court
said uses reasonably to be anticipated included the raising or lower-
ing of the grade of the street, the laying of pavements and construc-
tion of culverts, the building and operation of a street railroad, con-
struction of sewers and the laying of gas and water pipes. For these
changes no damages will be awarded.
Unanticipated uses have included an ordinary railroad as dis-
tinguished from a local street railway, 9 a water supply ditch,70 a
viaduct,' an underpass, 72 and a material change of street grade.
73
As to the use of the street for an ordinary railroad, the city may
have the power to control railroads passing into the city and even
the power to license the use of the streets to an ordinary railroad.
This power, however, does not serve as notice to the landowner,
who dedicates or buys lots next to a street, that a likely use of the
street will include an ordinary railroad. Further, the ordinance
granting a license to the railroad will not immunize the railroad
from liability for actual injuries sustained by abutting landowners
even though the ordinance is within the city's power.7 4
Despite the remark in the early case that changes in the street
grade could be anticipated and therefore were not compensable,
certain refinements of policy have been enunciated in later cases.
;5 It is easier to award compensation under the Colorado Constitution which provides compen-
sation where property is "taken or damaged" than under others that compensate only for property
"token." Comment, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 155 (1937).
66 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City & County
of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115,
186 Pac. 904 (1919); Russo v. City of Pueblo, 63 Colo. 519, 168 Pac. 649 (1917); City of Colorado
Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914); Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122,
95 Poc. 343 (1908); City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894); Town of Longmont v.
Parker, 14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac.
714 (1887); City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883).
67 Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131 Pac. 409 (1913); City of Pueblo v.
tSroit0 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714
(1887); City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883).
68 Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887); City of Denver v. Bayer,
7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). See also Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131
Pac. 409 (1913).
69 Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry., 14 Fed. 394 (C.C.D.Colo. 1882); Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Bourne,
11 Colo. 59, 16 Pac. 839 (1887); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887);
City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). Mere increase in railroad traffic is within
the original servitude and is not further grounds for compensation. Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan,
43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343 (1908).
70 Town of Longmont v. Parker, 14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890).
71 Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); City
of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894).
72 City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914).
73 City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac 595 (1902).
74 Denver & S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343 (1908); Denver & S.R. Ry. v.
Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac.
714 (1887).
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In City of Denver v. Bonestee ,7 5 the court refused to be influenced
by that early dictum where the city materially changed the grade,
of the street and the lot owner had made improvements in reliance:
upon an established grade. 76 In Bonesteel the court summarized
the holdings of other jurisdictions:
Some of them hold that a city is liable in damages to the
abutting owner of land on a street the grade of which has
been reduced from the natural surface, whether it be the
one first established or for a change of a previously estab-
lished grade. Others seem to restrict liability to cases where
there has been a change of a previous grade, and to exempt
from the operation of the constitutional provision the first
reduction of grade from the natural surface.'
The rule that the lot owner must anticipate reasonable changes
which are for the good of the public possibly is not affected greatly
by the decision to allow recovery for a material change of street
grade. The first establishment of grade is certainly to be anticipated.
Subsequent changes would be rare and could be justifiably classed
as unanticipated.
Only four years after the Bonesteel case the court further solid-
ified the law as to street grade changes in the case of Leiper v. City
& County of Denver7s where the facts presented were that of an
original change of grade from the natural surface. The court ap-
proved of Bonesteel, but was constrained by the same early dictum,
and held that the first change of grade made in accordance with
the first establishment of grade, in other words the change from the
natural surface, was reasonably to be anticipated and no recovery
could be had. The court concluded:
As well said by Judge Dillon, while sensible of the ap-
parent difficulty of defining the grounds for the distinction,
we regard it as almost, if not quite, stare decisis in this jur-
isdiction, that, for the raising or lowering of the grade of a
street by a municipality from the natural surface to the
grade established in the first instance, the municipality is
not liable to the abutting lot owner for consequential dam-
ages to his property, unless the change of grade is unrea-
sonable, or has been negligently made.7 '
3. Extent of Access. The taking or damaging of access is a com-
pensable injury as noted above. The injury is compensable even
though the access is not wholly taken. For instance, a man should
be compensated for loss of business where the street upon which he
is located is no longer a commonly traveled way as a result of some
obstruction set up by the city.O
The easement of an abutting landowner that may be taken or
75 See note 73 supra.
76 When plaintiff landowner relies upon the appearance of the grade and fails to inquire as to
the established grade of the street, that failure moy prevent recovery. See City of Denver v.
Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10 Colo.App. 413, 52 Poc. 86 (1897).
77 See note 73 supro at 111, 69 Poc. at 596.
7S 36 Colo. 110, 85 Pac. 849 (1906).
791Id. at 118, 85 Pac. at 851.
SO Minneaua Lumber Co. v. City & (ounty of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919). See
toth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo.
115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919); City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac. 595 (1902); City of
Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789 (1894).
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damaged by changed use or vacation extends to the full width of
the street and not just to the center of the street."'
4. Factors Affecting Recovery-Damages. The abutting land-
owner who has been injured by an unanticipated use of the street
is undoubtedly entitled to recover. Some care must be taken, how-
ever, to choose the proper party defendant. The plaintiff can recover
against the municipality only when the new, unantipicated use is
initiated for the direct safety and benefit of the public. For damage
from a use which brings about a private benefit, such as allowing
the railroad to use a street, the recovery may be had against only
that private user on the theory that the one gaining a benefit should
compensate for injury to others.8
An abutting landowner may be held to have impliedly assented
to a use that has continued without objection from him for a long
period of time
s. 8 3
A release by the landowner of claims for damage from con-
struction of a railroad or any other use will prevent the person re-
leasing from later objecting to an alteration of the rails or an
alteration of whatever use it is; the use has not changed.
4
Colorado follows orthodox law in holding that a person who
suffers only in kind like the rest of the citizenry from a change of
use of the street cannot recover for the injury. The injury must be
particular, different in kind, special, and affecting property or an
appurtenance.85
The term "abutting landowner" is, in this area of the law, used
to define a general class of persons. But it is not used so strictly as
to deny recovery in a proper case to one whose property does not
abut the portion of the street that has been applied to a different
use. The court, in Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt,8 6 said:
The cases in this and in other jurisdictions, which
denied a recovery to one whose property was located on an-
other street, or on a different part of the street vacated or
obstructed, were generally cases where such plaintiff or
complainant was not deprived of the only reasonable means
of access to his property. 13 R.C.L. 74, sec. 65. There are au-
thorities holding that one whose property does not abut
upon the street or part of the street which is vacated is
entitled to compensation where all access to his property to
the system of streets in one direction is cut off. 28 Cyc. 1083
,1 Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
82 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960) (no discussion as to why private land-
owners abutting the vacated street were proper defendants, but presumed they benfited most);
Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919) (railroad claimed that
damage actually resulted from the vacation, but court said the vacation was solely to allow
development of railroad); City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Pac. 794 (1914)
(recovery against city because underpass was primarily for benefit of city traffic even though
railroad built it); Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Bourne, 11 Colo. 59, 16 Pac. 839 (1887) (recovery from
railroad); Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714 (1887) (recovery from railroad);
Sorensen v. Town of Greeley, 10 Colo. 369, 15 Pac. 803 (1887) (no recovery against city where
railroad destroyed flume carrying water to plaintiff's crops; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau,
10 Colo. 105, 14 Pac. 48 (1887) and Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104, 14 Pac.
49 (1887) (no recoveries from city where flume carrying water to mining company leaked); City
of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883) (no recovery from city for railroad in street).
83 Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290, 25 Pac. 165 (1890); Denver & S.F. Ry. v.
Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
84 Denver, U. & P. Ry. v. Toohey, 15 Colo. 297, 25 Pac. 166 (1890).
85 City of Colorado Springs v. Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P.2d 988 (1942); Minnequa Lumber Co.
v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1919); Gilbert v. Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry.,
13 Colo. 501, 22 Pac. 814 (1889).
8667 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
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. . . The correct rule, applicable in the instant case, is
that the owner of property which does not abut on the part
of the street closed is entitled to compensation, provided he
is able to prove special and peculiar damage.
8 7
This case found that the plaintiff's easement had been sub-
stantially impaired. It found that the plaintiff, as a result of the
construction of an approach to a viaduct and the closing of certain
other streets, had no access to the business district, even by going
a reasonable distance out of the way, due to lack of through streets
and presence of railroad tracks. The case thus came within the rule
to which reference has been made that one whose property does
not abut upon the street vacated is still entitled to compensation if
all access to the system of streets in one direction is cut off.
The case is in this way distinguishable from Whitsett v. Union
Depot & R.R. 8 where the plaintiff complained that the Union Depot
was placed in his direct path to the business district, but nothing
showed that he was cut off from the whole system of streets in that
direction.
The measure of compensation for interference of ingress and
egress is the actual diminution in the market value of the abutting
land, for any use to which it could reasonably be put, which has
resulted directly from the changed use or vacation of the s'reet.s
5. Other Theories of Recovery. Even though a constitutionally
compensable injury cannot be established, the city may be held
liable under tort law for negligently making the change.90
Another theory used to recover damages for wrongful use of
streets is that of public nuisance. 91 This theory also requires show-
ing a special or peculiar injury beyond that suffered in common
with the public. Nuisance might be of value where the plaintiff is
otherwise estopped to question the use, but a public nuisance could
be established in the "altered" use. The theory of nuisance may also
be valuable when the statute of limitation period has run since the
change of use occurred, but a continuing nuisance can be estab-
lished, against which the statute begins to run anew each day.Y
And, as mentioned earlier, the theory of public nuisance can be the
basis of a suit for injunction against the wrongful use.
IV. VACATION
The municipal authorities have the power to vacate streets
when the action would be in the best interests of the public. These
vacations may take place in order that a changed use can be carried
out, or they may take place as an independent act solely because
the public no longer needs the street for passage. In either event
the act must not be arbitrary.' 4 Private benefit may accrue from
the vacation but not at the expense of the public interests.
S7 Id. at 118-19, 186 Pac. at 906.
SS 10 Colo. 243, 15 Pac. 339 (1887).
89 City of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 Pac. 595 (1902); Town of Longmont v. Parker,
14 Colo. 386, 23 Pac. 443 (1890).
90 City of Denver v. Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885).
91 Jackson v. Kiel, 13 Colo. 378, 22 Poc. 504 (1889).
92 Union Pac. Ry. v. Foley, 19 Colo. 280, 35 Pac. 542 (1893).
93 A deed of vacation is competent evidence when a public highway is alleged. Gromer a.
Papke, 71 Colo. 440, 207 Pac. 862 (1922).
94 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Gold Mining Co., 60 Colo. 220, 152 Pac. 896 (1915).
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The Colorado Constitution provides:
Section 25. Special legislation prohibited.-The general
assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the
following enumerated cases, that is to say; for granting
divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or
highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys, and
public grounds .... 95
This specifically prohibits the legislature from vacating streets, but
it does not prohibit delegation. By this restriction it is implied that
the legislature has the power to authorize the municipality to act in
such cases.96
A. By Private Persons
Colorado once had a statute that provided that streets could be
vacated by private action with the consent of all the landowners in
a town site or subdivision of not less than four blocks adjacent to
each other.97 No statute of the legislature can confer upon public or
private individuals the power to vacate a street in an arbitrary man-
ner. Any deed of abutting owners which purported to vacate the
street under the authority of the statute, but which was done ar-
bitrarily was a nullity s8 The same principle would govern a vaca-
tion by public authorities.
While the emphasis of this study is upon city streets, in many
cases streets and roads and highways are treated the same" 9 Under
this statute which allowed private action of vacation, however,
there was a distinction. This statute did not include within its de-
scription a "road" in any outlying area that had not been subdivided
into blocks because streets and alleys exist only where the land is
in blocks.'00
B. Compensation for Damage
So that it is not overlooked, the vacation of a street will often
operate to deny abutting landowners of part of their access. To the
extent that there is special injury, there can be recovery the same
as when the use is changed.101
95 Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
96 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Mining Co., 60 Colo. 220, 152 Pac. 896 (1915); Whitsett
e. Union Depot & R.R., 10 Cola. 243, 15 Pac. 339 (1887),
97 This repealed statute can be found in Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 163, § 117 (1935).
98 City of Goldfield v. Golden Cycle Minina Co., supra note 96.
99 Armstrong v. Johnson Storage & Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928).
100 Balanced Rock Scenic Attractions, Inc. v. Town of Manitou, 38 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1930).
101 Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt,
67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1919).
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C. Nature and Effects of Reversion
1. Early Confusion. An early case in Colorado, Denver & S.F.
Ry. v. Domke, '0 2 contained surprising language, inconsistent with
the common law, which caused some confusion as to the nature of
the title and its effect upon vacation of the street. The court, in dis-
cussing the right of abutting landowners to enjoin the change from
a street railway to an ordinary railway, said:
As we have already seen, the fee to Willow Lane and Clark
Street is by law vested in the city in trust for the use of the
public. It is not, and never was, in the present plaintiffs,
who are purchasers of lots subsequent to the dedication of
the streets. There is no evidence to show that the grants to
them included the reversionary interest or reserved rights,
if any such interest or rights there be, of the dedicator in
this fee. If the street should be abandoned by the municipa-
lity, or for any other reason the trust should fail, and the
fee pass out of the city, it would not revert to plaintiffs.
Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301. It follows, therefore, that
the increased burden mentioned would not constitute an
actual taking of plaintiffs' property, though their peculiar
interest in the street as abutting owners might entitle them
to compensation for injuries inflicted.1 1"
The court continues immediately with what would seem to be
more nearly orthodox reasoning and not quite so extreme:
Besides, it is suggested that, where such a qualified fee in
the city as we are now considering exists, "the reversionary
right of the owner of the fee in the surface of the street is
too remote and contingent to be of any appreciable value,
or to be regarded as property, which, under the constitu-
tion, is required to be paid for when its use is appropriated
by the public." Spencer v. Railroad Co. 23 W. Va. 406, and
cases cited.11
4
Later the court, in Olin v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 10' took the op-
portunity to rid itself of the strong language to the effect that upon
vacation the land would not revert to the abutting lot owners. In
that case the court said that this language had been mere dicta. It
proceeded to note also that the Domke case was probably the rea-
son why the legislature had amended the statute in 1889 in which it
provided that upon vacation, the fee vested in the abutting lot
owners to the center of the street.1
0 6
2. Conveyance of Abutting Lots Before Vacation. To form a
basis for discussion of the effect of a vacation upon the state of the
title, the effect of conveyances of abutting land should be examined.
Having reasoned that the grantee of land is entitled to all the
appurtment advantages, the rule has been followed that the grantee
takes title to the center of the street abutting, to the extent that the
102 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777 (1888).
103 Id. at 254, 17 Poc. at 780.
104 Id. at 254-55, 17 Pac. at 780.
105 25 Colo. 177, 53 Poc. 454 (1898).
106 Colo. Sess. Lows 1889, § 1 at 461-62.
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grantor has any interest in it, unless the grant expressly excludes
the street.107
An exception to this rule, or a further elaboration of it, is that
where the abutter-grantor has only an easement in the street and
the fee is vested in the public, then the interest to the center of the
street is not conveyed appurtment. The conveyance goes only to the
edge of the street.108 Thus, the rule is of importance only where the
fee to the street is held to be in the dedicator, and has not passed
to the city, that is, where the street originated by a common law
dedication.
Another situation that bears upon the application of the rule is
that once a conveyance has separated the street from the lots either
by describing them separately or by excluding one, then subsequent
grantors can never be held to have included the street in the con-
veyance describing the lots only.1'0
An interesting interpretation of a deed, and the application of
these rules occurred in Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood.""0 A
phrase in the deed read:
[T] hat in the event said street north of the lots hereby con-
veyed (lots 48 and 49) and now known as Sheridan Ave-
nue, should for any reason be vacated, or cease to be used as
a public street, then the party of the second part shall have
the refusal of purchasing a strip fifty feet in width on the
north of the property hereby conveyed at the then market
value thereof, which value shall be fixed by any court of
competent jurisdiction."'
The phrase was held to be repugnant to the previous express un-
restricted grant and therefore not operative to, in any way, over-
come the presumption of conveying title to the center of the street.
3. Vesting Upon Vacation. Colorado cases have held the fee to
the street to vest in the abutting landowner under the common law
or by virtue of the Colorado statutes which have generally been a
reenactment of the common law with slight variations in specific
situations.
112
4. Conveyance After Vacation. A recent case divided the Colo-
rado court on the question of conveyances after vacation of a street.
Morrissey v. Achziger"1 3 deserves special treatment. The area
through which the street in question had run was platted and the
streets therein were dedicated in 1887. In 1937, the street was
vacated in front of lots 7 through 10, owned at that time by Stella
Kate Cullen. Cullen died leaving the lots to one Sarah Burns who
conveyed "Lots Six (6), Seven (7), Eight (8), Nine (9) and Ten
(10), Block Sixteen ...... to the defendant Morrissey, who, in turn,
conveyed to the plaintiff by a like description.
The plaintiffs brought a quiet title action over the area formerly
in the street. The defendant, Morrissey, claimed that the area of the
107 Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood, 79 Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926); McDonald v. Kummer,
56 Colo. 153, 137 Pac. 51 (1913) (dictum); Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac.
574 (1902) (dictum); Olin v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 25 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454 (1898).
108McDonald v. Kummer, 56 Colo. 153, 137 Pac. 51 (1913) (dictum).
109 Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574 (1902).
11079 Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926).
111 Id. at 652, 248 Pac. at 9.
112 Morrissey v. Achziger, 364 P.2d 187 (Cola. 1961); Skerritt Inv. Co. v. City of Englewood, 79
Colo. 645, 248 Pac. 6 (1926); Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels, 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574 (1902).
The present statute is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-12 (1953).
113 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
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street was not intended to be passed to the plaintiffs. He also
claimed that he should have reformation of the deed from Burns to
reflect the true intent between Burns and himself that the street
area was to pass.
Briefly the court said that the original abutting owner, Cullen,
had been vested with the fee upon vacation of the street. This was
in no way determinative of the case, however. The court held that
the strip of land formerly in the street must be included in the de-
scription to be conveyed with the lot. The court said:
Certainly a person owning contiguous tracts of land can
convey one without conveying the other. A deed which ac-
curately and correctly describes a tract of land is not sub-
ject to construction or interpretation. If the description does
not express the intention of the parties, reformation is the
proper remedy. To hold otherwise would create chaos and
add a new and frightening chapter to the law of conveyanc-
ing.
11 4
Mr. Justice Doyle, two other justices joining, said:
I respectfully dissent! . .. [W]e are warned that "To
hold otherwise would create chaos and add a new and
frightening chapter to the law of conveyancing." I submit
that a rule which has a settling rather than an unsettling
effect on titles is not apt to create chaos. A rule which pre-
vents properties from being disjointed and which is de-
signed to obviate the existence of unusable rectangles of
property which could only serve to haunt adjacent owners
is not going to create chaos.'
1 5
Such was the theme of a convincing dissenting opinion. Mr.
Justice Doyle thought it was important to determine the ownership
of the street area. Because the street was located outside the city
limits, and because no Colorado statute vests title in the county the
common law must therefore govern.
Where the common law governs, the public acquires merely
an easement; the fee remains in the landowner. If the fee remains
in the landowner, he reasoned, then upon vacation of the street the
land is freed from the public easement but none of its area is sub-
ject to any change in ownership.
Mr. Justice Doyle inquires: "what change is effected by vaca-
tion which requires that it be mentioned in a conveyance?"
'"16
The law contains authority for the majority view of the court
that the area formerly in the street must be described to be con-
veyed. 1 7 To support this theory it is said that after vacation the
reason for the rule no longer exists; the owner is vested with title
and with possession and control and thus can choose to convey it in
whole or in separate tracts as he can with any land owned absolute-
lv. "Land is never appurtenant to land," the several cases say, and
one tract of land is never passed as an incident or accretion by
conveyance of an adjoining tract."8
114 Id. at 189.
11. Id. at 189-91.
1161 Id. at 191.
117 Both 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets § 1192 (3d ed. 1911) and Annot., 2 A.L.R. 6, 33 (1919)
quote from White v. Jefferson, 110 Minn. 276, 124 N.W. 373 (1910).
11 See the Washington cases discussed in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 982, 1003 (1956).
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Title Standard Number 4 calls for any conveyance made after
vacation to include a specific description of that area of the prior
street if it is to be successfully conveyed." 9 Morrissey relied heavily
on this title standard 1 20 and Doyle's dissent charged influence by it.
The advisability of adherence to these standards is not here to be
discussed except to say that they do not and should not have force
of law.
The dissenting viewpoint is also supported in law and is the
prevalent viewpoint of the recent cases.'1
The question cannot escape being one of construction. The ma-
jority silently treated the land as being two tracts of land, the lot
was a different tract from the street. The conveyance, under this
view, became unambiguous. "Lot Seven" meant to the edge of the
street.
The dissent treats the land as always having been one tract.
Upon this basis the applicable rule is that all the grantor's interest
is conveyed that is not reserved.
Niceties of title have been troublesome in these Colorado cases.
The court, in this Morrissey case, has ignored the nature of the title
in the street. The case fails to give importance to the state of the
title in an effort to conform to local title examination practices. The
case is objectionable in that the majority has ignored what has
helped to standardize and give predictability to property law, that
is, the concept of various types of ownership.
A slightly different problem for the court has been the enact-
ment of statutes giving a "fee" to the city. The court has always
tended toward the common law easement, with the result that the
city has gained nothing by this statutory fee. For example, where
a statutory dedication fails the resulting common law dedication
will create an easement even though the original intent was to pass
a fee. The court has also required strict compliance with the statute
to complete a statutory dedication thereby limiting the number of
times the city receives a fee.
Most notable of the court's tendency was the Bohn Mining case
where the use of the subsoil for mining raised a question concern-
ing the nature of the fee vested in the city. The "fee" suddenly
became conspiciously similar to the common law easement.
Colorado has produced some interesting ramifications of this
area of the law and in the process has nullified the statutory pro-
visions as to ownership.
119 Colo. Bar Ass'n, Real Estate Standards No. 4.
120 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Morrissey . Achziger, 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
121 Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 982, 1002 (1956).
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